There is a large amount of work dedicated to the formal verification of security protocols. In this article, we revisit and extend the NP-complete decision procedure for a bounded number of sessions. We use a, now standard, deducibility constraint formalism for modeling security protocols. Our first contribution is to give a simple set of constraint simplification rules, that allows to reduce any deducibility constraint to a set of solved forms, representing all solutions (within the bound on sessions).
INTRODUCTION
Security protocols are small programs that aim at securing communications over a public network, like Internet. Considering the increasing size of networks and their dependence on cryptographic protocols, a high level of assurance is needed in the correctness of such protocols. The design of such protocols is difficult and error-prone; many attacks are discovered even several years after the publication of a protocol. Consequently, there has been a growing interest in applying formal methods for validating cryptographic protocols and many results have been obtained. The main advantage of this approach is its relative simplicity which makes it amenable to automated analysis. For example, the secrecy preservation is co-NP-complete for a bounded number of sessions [Amadio and Lugiez 2000; Rusinowitch and Turuani 2001] , and decidable for an unbounded number of sessions under some additional restrictions [Comon-Lundh and Cortier 2003; Durgin et al. 1999; Lowe 1998; Ramanujam and Suresh 2005] . Many tools have also been developed to automatically verify cryptographic protocols [Armando et al. 2005; Blanchet 2001; Millen and Shmatikov 2001; Cremers 2008] .
Generalizing the Constraint System Approach. In this paper, we reinvestigate and extend the NP-complete decision procedure for a bounded number of sessions [Rusinowitch and Turuani 2001] . In this setting (i.e., finite number of sessions), deducibility constraint systems have become the standard model for verifying security properties, with a special focus on secrecy. Starting with Millen and Shmatikov [2001] many results [Comon-Lundh and Shmatikov 2003; Baudet 2005; Bursuc et al. 2007 ] have been obtained and several tools [Corin and Etalle 2002] have been developed within this framework. Our first contribution is to provide a generic approach derived from Comon-Lundh and Shmatikov [2003] to decide general security properties. We show that any deducibility constraint system can be transformed in (possibly several) much simpler deducibility constraint systems that are called solved forms, preserving all solutions of the original system, and not only its satisfiability. In other words, the deducibility constraint system represents in a symbolic way all the possible sequences of messages that are produced, following the protocol rules, whatever are the intruder's actions. This set of symbolic traces is infinite in general. Solved forms are a simple (and finite) representation of such traces and we show that it is suitable for the verification of many security properties. We also consider sorted terms, symmetric and asymmetric encryption, pairing and signatures, but we do not consider algebraic properties like Abelian groups or exclusive or. In addition, we prove termination in polynomial time of the (nondeterministic) deducibility constraint simplification. Compared to Rusinowitch and Turuani [2001] , our procedure preserves all solutions. Hence, we can represent for instance, all attacks on the secrecy and not only decide if there exists one. Moreover, presenting the decision procedure using a small set of simplification rules yields more flexibility for further extensions and modifications.
The main originality is that the method is applicable to any security property that can be expressed as a formula on the protocol trace and the agent memories. For example, our decision procedure (published in the LPAR'06 proceedings [Cortier and Zȃlinescu 2006] ) has been used in for proving that a new notion of secrecy in presence of hashes is decidable (and co-NP-complete) for a bounded number of sessions. It has also been used in Cortier et al. [2007] in the proof of modularity results for security of protocols. To illustrate the large applicability of our decision procedure, we show in this article how it can be used for proving co-NP-completeness of three kinds of security properties: the existence of key cycles, authentication-like properties, and secrecy of protocols with timestamps.
For authentication properties, we introduce a small logic that allows to specify authentication and some similar security properties. Using our solved forms, we show that any property that can be expressed within this logic can be decided. The logic is smaller than NPATRL [Syverson and Meadows 1996] or PS-LTL [Corin et al. 2005; Corin 2006 ], but we believe that decidability holds for a larger logic, closer to the two previous ones. However, the goal of this work is not to introduce a new logic, but rather to highlight the proof method. Note also that the absence of key cycles cannot be expressed in any of the three mentioned logics because it is not only a trace property but also a property of the message structure (see the following).
For timestamps, we actually retrieve a significant fragment of the decidable class identified by Bozga et al. [2004] . We believe that our result can lead more easily to an implementation, since we only need to adapt the procedure implemented in AVISPA [Armando et al. 2005 ], while Bozga et al. have designed a completely new decision procedure, which de facto has not been implemented.
Application to Key Cycles. Our second main contribution is to use this approach to provide an NP-complete decision procedure for detecting the generation of key cycles during the execution of a protocol, in the presence of an intruder, for a bounded number of sessions. To the best of our knowledge, this problem has not been addressed before. The key cycle problem is a problem that arises from the cryptographic community. Indeed, two distinct approaches for the rigorous design and analysis of cryptographic protocols have been pursued in the literature: the so-called Dolev-Yao, symbolic, or formal approach on the one hand and the cryptographic, computational, or concrete approach on the other hand. In the symbolic approach, messages are modeled as formal terms that the adversary can manipulate using a fixed set of operations. In the cryptographic approach, messages are bit strings and the adversary is an arbitrary probabilistic polynomial-time Turing machine. While results in this model yield strong security guarantees, the proofs are often quite involved and only rarely suitable for automation [Goldwasser and Micali 1984; Bellare and Rogaway 1993] .
Related Work on Key Cycles. Some authors circumvent the problem of key cycles by providing new security definitions for encryption, Key Dependent Messages security, or KDM in short, that allow key cycles [Adão et al. 2005; Backes et al. 2007 ]. However, the standard security notions do not imply these new definitions, and ad-hoc encryption schemes have to be constructed. Most of these constructions use the random oracle model, which is provably nonimplementable. Though there was some recent progress [Hofheinz and Unruh 2008] towards constructing a KDM-secure encryption scheme in the standard model, none of the usual, implemented encryption schemes has been proved to satisfy KDM-security.
In a passive setting, Laud [2002] proposed a modification of the Dolev-Yao model such that the new model is a sound abstraction even in the presence of key cycles. In his model the intruder's power is strengthened by adding new deduction rules. With the new rules, from a message containing a key cycle, the intruder can infer all keys involved in the cycle as well as the messages encrypted by these keys. Subsequently, Janvier [2006] proved that the intruder deduction problem remains polynomial for the modified deduction system. It
Outline of the Article. The messages and the intruder capabilities are modeled in Section 2. In Section 3.1, we define deducibility constraint systems and show how they can be used to express protocol executions. In Section 3.2, we define security properties and their satisfaction. In Section 4, we show that the satisfaction of any (in)security property can be nondeterministically, polynomially reduced to the satisfiability of the same problem, this time on simpler constraint systems. The simplification rules derived from Comon-Lundh and Shmatikov [2003] are provided in Section 4.1. They are actually not sufficient to ensure termination in polynomial time. Thus we introduce in Section 4.6 a refined decision procedure, which is correct, complete, and terminating in polynomial time. We show in Section 5 how this approach can be used to obtain our main result of NP-completeness for the decision of the key cycles generation. In Section 6, we introduce a small logic to express authentication-like properties and we show how our technique can be used to decide any formula of this logic. In Section 7, we show how it can be used to derive NP-completeness for protocols with timestamps. Some concluding remarks about further work can be found in Section 8.
MESSAGES AND INTRUDER CAPABILITIES

Syntax
Cryptographic primitives are represented by function symbols. More specifically, we consider a signature (S, F) consisting in a set of sorts S = {s, s 1 . . . } and a set of function symbols F = {enc, enca, sign, , priv}. Each function symbol is associated with an arity: ar is a mapping from F to S * × S, which we write ar( f ) = s 1 × · · · × s n → s. The four first function symbols in F are binary: for each of them there are s 1 , s 2 , s ∈ S such that ar( f ) = s 1 × s 2 → s. The last symbol is unary: there are s, s ∈ S such that ar( f ) = s → s . The symbol represents the pairing function. The terms enc(m, k) and enca(m, k) represent respectively the message m encrypted with the symmetric (resp. asymmetric) key k. The term sign(m, k) represents the message m signed by the key k. The term priv(a) represents the private key of the agent a. For simplicity, we confuse the agents names with their public key. (Or conversely, we claim that agents identities are defined by their public keys). N = {a, b . . . } is a set of names and X = {x, y . . . } is a set of variables. Each name and each variable is associated with a sort. We assume that there are infinitely many names and infinitely many variables of each sort.
The set of terms of sort s is defined inductively by
We assume a special sort Msg that subsumes all the other sorts: any term is of sort Msg.
Sorts are mostly left unspecified in this article. They can be used in applications to express that certain operators can be applied only to some restricted terms. For example, we use sorts explicitly to express that messages are encrypted by atomic keys (only in Section 5), and to represent timestamps (only in Section 7).
As usual, we write V(t) for the set of variables occurring in t. For a set T of terms, V(T ) denotes the union of the variables occurring in the terms of T . A term t is ground or closed if and only if V(t) = ∅. A position or an occurrence in a term t is a sequence of positive integers corresponding to paths starting from the root in the tree-representation of t. For a term t and a position p in this term, t| p denotes the subterm of t at position p. We write St(t) and St(T ) for the set of subterms of a term t, and of a set of terms T , respectively. The size of a term t, denoted |t|, is defined inductively as usual: |t| = 1 if t is a variable or a name and
If T is a set of terms then |T | denotes the sum of the sizes of its elements. The cardinality of a set T is denoted by T . By abuse of notation, we sometimes denote by T, u the set T ∪ {u}.
Substitutions are written σ = { t 1 / x 1 , . . . , t n / x n } with dom(σ ) = {x 1 , . . . , x n }. We only consider well-sorted substitutions, for which x i and t i have the same sort. σ is closed if and only if every t i is closed. The application of a substitution σ to a term t is written σ (t) or tσ . A most general unifier of two terms u and v is denoted by mgu(u, v).
Intruder Capabilities
The ability of the intruder is modeled by the deduction rules displayed in Figure 1 and corresponds to the usual Dolev-Yao rules.
Pairing, signing, symmetric and asymmetric encryption are the composition rules. The other rules are decomposition rules. Intuitively, these deduction rules say that an intruder can compose messages by pairing, encrypting, and signing messages provided she has the corresponding keys and conversely, she can decompose messages by projecting or decrypting provided she holds the decryption keys. For signatures, the intruder is also able to verify whether a signature sign(m, k) and a message m match (provided she has the verification key), but this does not give rise to any new message: this capability needs not to be represented in the deduction system. We also consider an optional rule S sign(x, y) S x that expresses the ability to retrieve the whole message from its signature. This property may or may not hold depending on the signature scheme, and that is why this rule is optional. Note that this rule is necessary for obtaining soundness properties with respect to cryptographic digital signatures. Our results will hold in both cases, whether or not this rule is considered in the deduction relation.
A proof tree (sometimes simply called a proof) is a tree whose labels are sequents T u where T is a finite set of terms and u is a term. A proof tree is inductively defined as follows.
-if u is a term and u ∈ T , then T u is a proof tree whose conclusion is T u, using the axiom; -if π 1 , . . . , π n are proof trees, whose respective conclusions are T u 1 , . . . , T u n , respectively, and
is a rule R of the Figure 1 such that, for some (well-sorted) substitution σ , t 1 σ = u 1 , . . . , t n σ = u n , then
is a proof tree using R, whose conclusion is T tσ .
We will call subproof a subtree of a proof tree. An strict subproof (respectively, immediate subproof ) of π is a subproof of π distinct from π (respectively, a maximal strict subproof of π ).
A term u is deducible from a set of terms T , which we sometimes write T u by abuse of notation, if there exists a proof tree whose conclusion is T u. Example 2.1. The term k 1 , k 2 is deducible from the set S 1 = {enc(k 1 , k 2 ), k 2 }, as the following proof tree shows:
DEDUCIBILITY CONSTRAINT SYSTEMS AND SECURITY PROPERTIES
Deducibility Constraint Systems are quite common [Millen and Shmatikov 2001; Comon-Lundh and Shmatikov 2003] in modeling security protocols. We recall here their definition and show how they can be used to specify general security properties. Then we prove that any deducibility constraint system can be transformed into simpler ones, called solved. Such simplified constraints are then used to decide the security properties.
Deducibility Constraint Systems
In the usual attacker's model, the intruder controls the network. In particular she can schedule the messages. Once such a scheduling is fixed, she can still replace the messages with fake ones, which are nevertheless accepted by the honest participants. More precisely, some pieces of messages cannot be analyzed by the participants, hence can be replaced by any other piece, provided that the attacker can construct the overall message. This can be used to mount attacks. In the formal model, pieces that cannot be analyzed are replaced with variables. Any substitution of these variables will be accepted, provided that the attacker can deduce (using the deduction system of Figure 1 ) the corresponding instance. The main problem then is to decide whether there is such a substitution, yielding a violation of the security property.
Let us give a detailed example recalling how possible execution traces are formalized.
Example 3.1. Consider the famous Needham-Schroeder asymmetric key authentication protocol [Needham and Schroeder 1978] designed for mutual authentication:
The agent A sends to B his name and a fresh nonce (a randomly generated value) encrypted with the public key of B. The agent B answers by copying A's nonce and adds a fresh nonce N B , encrypted by A's public key. The agent A acknowledges by forwarding B's nonce encrypted by B's public key. Formally, this protocol can be described using two roles A and B. The role A has two parameters: a, b (initiator and responder), and is (informally) specified as follows: where y is a variable: a cannot check that this piece of the message is a nonce generated by b. Hence it can be replaced by any term (or any term of a given sort, depending on what we want to model). Similarly, the role of B takes the two parameters b, a, and is specified as:
Without loss of generality, we may assume that send actions are performed as soon as the corresponding receive action is completed: this is the best scheduling strategy for the attacker, who will get more information for further computing fake messages. For this reason, we only need to consider the possible scheduling of receive events.
Let a, b be honest participants and i be a corrupted one. Consider one session A(a, i) and one session B(b, a). There are three message deliveries to schedule: A2, B1, B2, and B2 has to occur after B1. Assume the chosen scheduling is B1, A2, B2. In this scenario, the possible sequences of message delivery are instances of enca ( x, a , b) , enca( n a , y , a), enca(n b , b). The variables x, y can be replaced by any term, provided that the attacker can build the corresponding instances from her knowledge at the appropriate control point.
The initial intruder knowledge can be set to T 0 = {a, b, i, priv(i)}, including the private key of the corrupted agent.
For the first message delivery, the attacker has to be able to build the first message instance from this initial knowledge and the message sent at step A1:
This notation will be formally defined later on. Informally, this is a formula, which is satisfied by a substitution σ on x if enca( x, a , b)σ is deducible from T 1 , expressing the ability of the intruder to construct enca ( x, a , b) 
Then, the agent b replies sending the corresponding instance enca( x, n b , a), which increases the attacker's knowledge, hence enabling its use for building the next message; we get the second deducibility constraint:
Similarly, we construct a third deducibility constraint for the last message delivery:
Definition 3.2. A deducibility constraint system C is a finite set of expressions T u, called deducibility constraints, where T is a nonempty set of terms, called the left-hand side of the deducibility constraint and u is a term, called the right-hand side of the deducibility constraint, such that:
(1) the left-hand sides of all deducibility constraints are totally ordered by inclusion; (
Informally, the first condition states that the intruder knowledge is always increasing. The second condition expresses that variables abstract pieces of received messages: they have to occur first on the right side of a constraint T u, before occurring in some left side. Note that, due to point (1), T x exists if and only if the set {T | (T u ) ∈ C, x ∈ V(u )} is not empty. The linear ordering on left-hand sides also implies the uniqueness of the minimum. Hence (2) can be restated equivalently as:
In what follows, we may use this formulation instead.
The left-hand side of a deducibility constraint system C, denoted by lhs(C), is the maximal left-hand side of the deducibility constraints of C. The right-hand side of a deducibility constraint system C, denoted by rhs(C), is the set of righthand sides of its deducibility constraints. V(C) denotes the set of variables occurring in C. ⊥ denotes the unsatisfiable system. The size of a constraint system is defined as |C| def = |lhs(C) ∪ rhs(C)|. A deducibility constraint system C is also written as a conjunction of deducibility constraints
Definition 3.3. A solution σ of a deducibility constraint system C is a (wellsorted) ground substitution whose domain is V(C) and such that, for every T u ∈ C, T σ uσ .
Example 3.4. Coming back to Example 3.1, the substitution σ 1 = { n a / x , n b / y } is a solution of the deducibility constraint system since
Security Properties
Deducibility constraint systems represent in a symbolic and compact way a possibly infinite set of traces (behaviors), which depend on the attacker's actions. Security properties are formulas, that are interpreted over these traces.
Definition 3.5. Given a set of predicate symbols together with their interpretation over the set of ground terms, a (in)security property is a first-order formula φ built on these predicate symbols. A solution of φ is a ground substitution σ of V(φ) such that φσ is true in the given interpretation. (We also write σ |= φ). Deciding Security Properties for Cryptographic Protocols
If C is a deducibility constraint system and φ is a (in)security property, possibly sharing free variables with C, a closed substitution σ from V(φ) ∪ V(C) is an attack for φ and C, if is a solution of both C and φ.
Example 3.6. If the security property is simply true (which is always satisfied) and the only sort is Msg, then we find the usual deducibility constraint system satisfaction problem, whose satisfiability is known to be NP-complete [Rusinowitch and Turuani 2003] .
Example 3.7. Secrecy can be easily expressed by requiring that the secret data is not deducible from the messages sent on the network. We consider again the deducibility constraint system C 1 defined in Example 3.1. The (in)security property then expresses that n b is deducible: φ is the deducibility constraint T 3 n b . Note that we may view a constraint (system) as a first order formula.
Then the substitution σ 1 = { n a / x , n b / y } is an attack for φ and C 1 and corresponds to the attack found by Lowe [1996] . Note that such a deduction-based property can be directly included in the constraint system by adding a deducibility constraint T 3 n b .
Example 3.8. Let us show here an example of authentication property. Two agents A and B authenticate on some message m if whenever B finishes a session believing he has talked to A then A has indeed finished a session with B and they share the same value for m. Note that the agents A and B have in general a different view of the message m, depending, for example, on which nonces they have generated themselves and on which nonces they have received. If m A denotes the view of m from A and m B the view of m from B, then the insecurity property states that there is a trace in which these two messages are distinct.
Back to Example 3.1, consider another scenario with two instances of the role A: A(a, i) and A(a, b) and one instance of the role B: B(b, a) . The attacker schedules the communications as in Example 3.1: in particular the expected message delivery in A(a, b) is not scheduled (the message is not delivered). Then the deducibility constraint system C 1 is identical to C 1 , except that T 0 is replaced with T 0 = T 0 ∪ {enca( n a , a , b)}. The nonce x received by b should correspond to the nonce n a sent by a for b; we consider m A = n a , m B = x.
The failure of authentication can be stated as the simple formula x = n a . The substitution σ 1 defined in Example 3.7 is then an attack, since b accepts the nonce n a instead of n a : xσ 1 = n a .
In Sections 5, 6, and 7 we provide other examples corresponding to time constraints, more general authentication-like properties, or to express that no key cycles are allowed.
SIMPLIFYING DEDUCIBILITY CONSTRAINT SYSTEMS
Using simplification rules, solving deducibility constraint systems can be reduced to solving simpler constraint systems that we call solved. One nice property of the transformation is that it works for any security property. This definition corresponds to the notion of solved form in Comon-Lundh and Shmatikov [2003] . Note that the empty deducibility constraint system is solved. Solved deducibility constraint systems with the single sort Msg are particularly simple in the case of the true predicate since they always have a solution, as noticed in Millen and Shmatikov [2001] . Indeed, let T 1 be the smallest (w.r.t. inclusion) left hand side of all constraints of a deducibility constraint system. From Definition 3.2, T 1 is non empty and has no variables. Let t ∈ T 1 . Then the substitution θ defined by xθ = t for every variable x is a solution since T xθ = t for any constraint T x in the solved system.
Simplification Rules
The simplification rules we consider are defined in Figure 2 . For instance, the rule R 1 removes a redundant constraint, that is, when it is a logical consequence of smaller constraints. The rule R 3 guesses some identity (confusion) between two sent submessages.
All the rules are in fact indexed by a substitution: when there is no index, then the identity substitution is implicitly assumed. We write
Example 4.2. Let us consider the following deducibility constraint system C:
where
The deducibility constraint system C can be simplified into a solved form using (for example) the following sequence of simplification rules.
Deciding Security Properties for Cryptographic Protocols
The simplification rules are correct and complete: a deducibility constraint system C has a solution, which is also a solution of a (in)security property φ, if and only if there exists a deducibility constraint system C in solved form such that C * σ C and there is a solution of both C and φσ . Note that several simplification rules can possibly be applied to a given deducibility constraint system. THEOREM 4.3. Let C be a deducibility constraint system, θ a substitution, and φ a (in)security property.
(1) (Correctness) If C * σ C for some deducibility constraint system C and some substitution σ , and if θ is an attack for φσ and C , then σ θ is an attack for φ and C. 
Theorem 4.3 is proved in Sections 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4. Getting a polynomial bound on the length of simplification sequences requires however an additional memorization technique. This is explained in Section 4.6.
Correctness
We first give two simple lemmas.
PROOF. The statement follows by induction on the depth of a proof of T u, observing that no deduction rule introduces new variables. Indeed,
and V(t) ⊆ V(S) for the axiom (that is, if t ∈ S).
The next lemma shows the "cut elimination" property for the deduction system . 
As a consequence, if T ⊆ T , T v, and T u, for all u ∈ T \ T , then T v.
We show now that the simplification rules preserve deducibility constraint systems.
LEMMA 4.6. The simplification rules transform a deducibility constraint system into a deducibility constraint system. We show that C also satisfies the second point of the definition of deducibility constraint systems. Let (T u ) ∈ C and x ∈ V(T ). We have to prove that T x exists and T x T . We distinguish cases, depending on which simplification rule is applied:
-If the rule R 1 is applied, eliminating the constraint T u.
which contradicts the applicability of rule R 1 .
-If one of the rules R 2 , R 3 or R 3 is applied, then, for each constraint 
From condition 2 of Definition 3.2 applied to z, it follows that T z T y 0 . As z is in Y , this contradicts the choice of y 0 . Thus T x ⊆ T y 0 σ T σ = T .
-If the rule R 4 is applied, then there is nothing to prove.
-If some rule R f is applied, then the property is preserved, since, if
PROOF. If C is obtained by applying R 1 , then we have to prove that T τ uτ , where T u is the eliminated constraint. We know that
x in C with T T are also constraints in C . Thus, for all such constraints, we have that T τ xτ , and hence T τ xτ . Then, from Lemma 4.5, we obtain that T τ uτ .
If C is obtained by applying R 2 , R 3 or R 3 , then, for every constraint
If C is obtained by applying some rule R f , then we obtain that T τ f (u, v)τ from T τ uτ and T τ vτ by applying the corresponding inference rule (e.g. encryption if f = enc).
Finally, C cannot be obtained by the rule R 4 , since it is satisfiable. It follows that, in all cases, σ τ satisfies C.
Completeness
Let T 1 ⊆ T 2 ⊆ · · · ⊆ T n . We say that a proof π of T i u is left minimal if, whenever there is a proof of T j u for some j < i, then, replacing T i with T j in all left members of the labels of π , yields a proof of T j u. In other words, the left-minimal proofs are those that can be performed in a minimal T j .
We say that a proof is simple if all its subproofs are left minimal and there is no repeated label on any branch. Remark that a subproof of a simple proof is simple.
LEMMA 4.8. If there is a proof of T i u, then there is a simple proof of it.
PROOF. We prove the property by induction on the pair (i, m) (considering the lexicographic ordering), where m is the size of a proof of T i u.
If i = 1 then any (subproof of any) proof of T 1 u is left minimal and there exists a proof without repeated labels on any path.
If i > 1 and there is a j < i such that T j u, then we apply the induction hypothesis to obtain the existence of a simple proof of T j u. This proof is also a simple proof of T i u.
If i > 1 and there is no j < i such that T j u, then we apply the induction hypothesis on the immediate subproofs π 1 , . . . , π n of the proof π of T i u. If the label T i u appears in one of the resulting proofs π i , then replace π with a subproof of π i whose conclusion is T i u. The new proof does not contain any label T i u. Otherwise, if π is obtained by applying an inference rule R to π 1 , . . . , π n , then replace π with the proof obtained by applying R to π 1 , . . . , π n . In both cases the resulting proof and all of its subproofs are left minimal by construction, and hence the resulting proof is simple.
LEMMA 4.9. Let C be a deducibility constraint system, θ be a solution of C, T i be a left hand side of C such that, for any (T v 
) ∈ C, if T T i , then v is a variable. Let u be any term. If there is a simple proof of T i θ u, whose last inference rule is a decomposition, then there is a non-variable t
PROOF. Consider a simple proof π of T i θ u. We may assume, without loss of generality, that i is minimal. Otherwise, we simply replace everywhere in the proof T i with a minimal T j such that T j θ u is derivable; by left minimality, we get again a proof tree, whose last inference rule is a decomposition. Such a T j ⊆ T i also satisfies the hypotheses of the lemma.
We reason by induction on the depth of the proof π. We make a case distinction, depending on the last rule of π :
The last rule is an axiom. Then u ∈ T i θ and there is t ∈ T i (thus t ∈ St(T i )) such that tθ = u. By contradiction, if t was a variable then T t w, with t ∈ V(w) is a constraint in C such that T t T i . Moreover, by hypothesis of the lemma, w must be a variable. Hence w = t. Then T t θ u, which contradicts the minimality of i.
The last rule is a symmetric decryption.
By simplicity, the last rule of π 1 cannot be a composition: T i θ u would appear twice on the same path. Then, by induction hypothesis, there is a nonvariable t ∈ St(T i ) such that tθ = enc(u, w). It follows that t = enc(t , t ) with t θ = u. If t was a variable, then T t θ t θ would be derivable. Hence T t θ u would be derivable, which again contradicts the minimality of i. Hence t is not variable, as required.
The last rule is an asymmetric decryption, (resp. projection, resp. unsigning). The proof is similar to the above one: by simplicity and by induction hypothesis, there is a nonvariable t ∈ St(T i ) such that tθ = enca(u, v) (resp. tθ = u, v , resp. tθ = sign(u, priv(v))). Then t = enca(t , t ) (resp. t = t , t , resp. t = sign(t, t )). t ∈ St(T i ), t θ = u and, by minimality of i, t is not a variable.
LEMMA 4.10. Let C be a deducibility constraint system and θ be a solution of C. Let T i be a left-hand side of a constraint in C and u be a term, such that: 
PROOF. Let j be minimal such that T j θ uθ . Thus j ≤ i and T j ⊆ T i . Consider a simple proof π of T j θ uθ. We reason by induction on the depth of π . We analyze the different cases, depending on the last rule of π:
The last rule is an axiom. Suppose, by contradiction, that u / ∈ T j . Then there is t ∈ T j such that tθ = uθ and t = u. By hypothesis 5, u is not a variable and, by hypothesis 2 of the lemma, t, u cannot be both nonvariable subterms of T i . It follows that t is a variable. Then T t θ tθ , which implies T t θ uθ , contradicting the minimality of j , since T t T j . Hence u ∈ T j and then T i u, as required.
The last rule is the symmetric decryption rule. There is w such that T j θ enc(uθ, w), T j θ w:
By simplicity, the last rule of the proof of T j θ enc(uθ, w) is a decomposition. By Lemma 4.9, there is t ∈ St(T j ), t not a variable, such that tθ = enc(uθ, w). Let t = enc(t 1 , t 2 ) and t 1 θ = uθ , t 2 θ = w. By induction hypothesis, T i t.
If t 1 was a variable, then T t 1 T j and, by hypothesis 1 of the lemma, T t 1 must be the left-hand-side of a solved constraint: (T t 1 t 1 ) ∈ C and therefore T t 1 θ uθ , contradicting the minimality of j . Now, by hypothesis 5 of the lemma, u is a nonvariable subterm of T i , hence t 1 , u are two non variable subterms of T i such that t 1 θ = uθ . By hypothesis 2 of the lemma, this implies t 1 = u.
On the other hand, if t 2 is a variable, t 2 ∈ V(T i ) implies T t 2 T i and, since T i is minimal unsolved, (T t 2 t 2 ) ∈ C, which implies t 2 ∈ T i . If t 2 is not a variable, then, from T j θ t 2 θ and by induction hypothesis, T i t 2 . So, in any case, T i t 2 . Now, we have both T i enc(u, t 2 ) and T i t 2 , from which we conclude that T i u, by symmetric decryption.
The last rule is an asymmetric decryption rule. There is a w such that T j θ priv(w) and T j θ enca(uθ, w). As in the previous case, there is a nonvariable t ∈ St(T j ) such that tθ = enca (uθ, w) . By induction hypothesis, T i t. Let t = enca(t 1 , t 2 ).
As in the previous case, t 1 cannot be a variable. Therefore t 1 , u are two nonvariable subterms of T i such that t 1 θ = uθ , which implies that t 1 = u. (We use here the hypotheses 2 and 5). On the other hand, the last rule in the proof of T j θ priv(w) is a decomposition (no composition rule can yield a term headed with priv). Then, by Lemma 4.9 (T j satisfies the hypotheses of the lemma since T j ⊆ T i ), there is a nonvariable subterm w 1 ∈ St(T j ) such that w 1 θ = priv(w). Let w 1 = priv(w 2 ). By induction hypothesis, T j priv(w 2 ).
By hypothesis 2 of the lemma, t 2 and w 2 cannot be both nonvariable, unless they are identical. Then, by hypotheses 3 and 4 of the lemma, we must have
The last rule is a projection rule.
As before, by simplicity, the last rule of the proof of T j θ uθ, v must be a decomposition and, by Lemma 4.9, there is a nonvariable term t ∈ St(T j ) such that tθ = uθ, v . We let t = t 1 , t 2 . By induction hypothesis, T i t. Now, as in the previous cases, t 1 cannot be a variable, by minimality of T j and hypothesis 1 of the lemma. Next, by hypotheses 2 and 5, we must have t 1 = u. Finally, from T i u, t 2 we conclude T i u by projection. The last rule is an unsigning rule.
This case is identical to the previous one.
The last rule is a composition. Assume for example that it is the symmetric encryption rule.
By point 2 of Definition 3.2 and hypothesis 1 of the lemma, u 1 ∈ T i (resp. u 2 ∈ T i ).
Otherwise, u 1 and u 2 are nonvariables. Then, by induction hypothesis, T i u 1 and T i u 2 . Hence in both cases we have T i u 1 and T i u 2 . Thus T i u.
The proof is similar for other composition rules.
LEMMA 4.11 (COMPLETENESS). If C is an unsolved deducibility constraint system and θ is a solution of C, then there is a deducibility constraint system C , a substitution σ , and a solution τ of C such that C σ C and θ = σ τ . Since θ is a solution, T i θ u i θ . Consider a simple proof of T i θ u i θ. We distinguish cases, depending on the last rule applied in this proof:
The last rule is a composition. Since u is not a variable, u = f (u 1 , . . . , u n ) and T i θ u j θ for every j = 1, ..., n. Then we may apply the transformation rule R f to C, yielding constraints T i u j in C for every j . θ is a solution of the resulting deducibility constraint system C by hypothesis.
The last rule is an axiom or a decomposition. By Lemma 4.9, there is a nonvariable term t ∈ St(T i ) such that tθ = u i θ. We distinguish then again between cases, depending on t, u i :
Case t = u i . Then, since t, u i are both nonvariable terms, we may apply the simplification rule R 2 to C: C σ C where C = Cσ and σ = mgu(t, u i ). Furthermore, tθ = u i θ , hence (by definition of a mgu) there is a substitution τ such that θ = σ τ . Finally, θ is a solution of C, hence τ is a solution of C .
Case t = u i . Then u i ∈ St(T i ).
(1) If there are two distinct nonvariable terms t 1 , t 2 ∈ St(T i ) such that t 1 θ = t 2 θ. Then we apply the simplification rule R 3 , yielding a deducibility constraint system C = Cσ . As in the previous case, there is a substitution τ such that θ = σ τ and τ is a solution of C . (2) If there are enca(t 1 , t 2 ), priv(t 3 ) ∈ St(T i ) such that either t 2 or t 3 is a variable, t 2 = t 3 and t 2 θ = t 3 θ , then we may apply the rule R 3 and conclude as in the previous case. (3) Otherwise, we match all hypotheses of Lemma 4.10 and we conclude that T i u i . Then the rule R 1 can be applied to C, yielding a deducibility constraint system, of which θ is again a solution.
Termination
The simplification rules also terminate, whatever strategy is used for their application:
LEMMA 4.12. The constraint simplification rules of Figure 2 are (strongly) terminating.
PROOF. Interpret any deducibility constraint system C as a pair of nonnegative integers I (C) = (n, m) where n is the number of variables of the system and m is the number of function symbols occurring in the right hand sides of the system (here, we assume no sharing of subterms). If C σ C , then I (C) > lex I (C ) where ≥ lex is the lexicographic ordering on pairs of integers. Indeed, the first component strictly decreases by applying R 2 , R 3 , R 3 , and any other rule strictly decreases the second component, while not increasing the first one. The well-foundedness of the lexicographic extension of a well-founded ordering implies the termination of any sequence of rules. 
Proof of Theorem 4.3
Theorem 4.3 follows from Lemmas 4.7, 4.11, and 4.12, by induction on the derivation length, and since deducibility constraint systems on which no simplification rule can be applied must be solved. Note that the extension of the correctness and completness lemmas to security properties is trivial. Indeed, if φ is a (in)security property, then θ is a solution of φσ if and only if σ θ is a solution of φ, for any substitutions θ and σ .
A Decision Procedure in NP-time
The termination proof of the last section does not provide with tight complexity bounds. In fact, applying the simplification rules may lead to branches of exponential length (in the size of the constraint system). Indeed when applying a simplification rule to a deducibility constraint, the initial constraint is removed from the constraint system and replaced by new constraint(s). But this deducibility constraint may appear again later on, due to other simplification rules. It is the case, for example, when considering the following deducibility constraint system.
The deducibility constraint system C is clearly satisfiable and its size is linear in n. We have that
This derivation is obtained by applying rule R 2 and then R 1 for each constraint T i enc(x i , k i ) with 1 ≤ i ≤ n. The rule R 1 cannot be applied to T n+1 σ x n σ since x 0 and the keys k i are not present in or derivable from T n+1 σ . Note that σ = σ ∪ { a / x 0 } is a solution of C and can be easily obtained by rule R 2 on the first constraint and then rule R 1 on both constraints.
However, there is a branch of length 3(2 n − 1) from T x n σ leading to T x 0 (in solved form), where T denotes T n+1 σ . This is easy to see by induction on n. It is true for n = 0. Then using only the rules R and R 1 , we have with m = 3(2 n−1 − 1) by induction hypothesis. The length of the branch is 2×3(2 n−1 −1)+3 = 3(2 n −1). This shows that there exist branches of exponential length in the size of the constraint.
We can prove that it is actually not useful to consider deducibility constraints that have already been seen before (like the constraint T x n−1 σ in our example). Thus we memorize the constraints that have already been visited. The constraint simplification rules, instead of operating on a single deducibility constraint system, rewrite a pair of two constraint systems, the second one representing deducibility constraints that have already been processed at this stage: if C σ C , then
. The constraints ("memorized") in D are those which were already analyzed (i.e., transformed or eliminated). The initial constraint system is C; ∅.
First, memorization indeed prevents from performing several times the same transformation:
LEMMA 4.13. If C is a deducibility constraint system and C; ∅ *
This kind of memorization is correct and complete in a more general setting. We assume in this section that the reader is familiar with the usual notions of first-order formulas, first-order structures, and models of first-order logic.
A (general) constraint is a (first-order) formula, together with an interpretation structure S. A (general) constraint system C is a finite set of constraints, whose interpretation is the same as their conjunction. If σ is an assignment of the free variables of C to the domain of S, σ is a solution of C if σ, S |= C. In the context of constraint systems, S is omitted: the satisfaction relation |= refers implicitly to S. It is extended, as usual, to entailment: C |= C if any solution of C is also a solution of C . We may consider constraints c as singleton constraint systems, and thus write for example c |= c instead of {c} |= {c }.
A (general) constraint system transformation is a binary relation ; on constraints such that, for any sequence (finite or infinite) C 1 ; · · · ;C n ; · · · , there is an ordering ≥ on individual constraints such that, for every i, for every c ∈ C i \ C i+1 , we have
This expresses the correctness of the transformations: only redundant formulas are removed. The ordering needs not to be well-founded. Our deducibility constraint systems and deducibility constraint simplification rules satisfy these properties. More precisely, we need to consider the substitutions (partial assignments) as part of the constraint system, in order to fit with the above definition: constraint systems come in two parts: a set of deducibility constraints and a set of solved equations, recording the substitution computed so-far. In other words, a sequence of simplification steps 
We show next that for any sequence C 0 σ 1 C 1 σ 2 . . . of simplification steps there is an ordering ≥ on the corresponding general constraints such that (4) holds.
We start by defining the ordering. First, we order the variables by x > y if, for some i, y ∈ V(xσ 1 . . . σ i ). Intuitively, x > y if x is instantiated before y in the considered derivation. Indeed, let i x be the minimum among all indexes i such that xσ i = x if this minimum exists and ∞ otherwise. Then x > y implies that either i x < i y , or i x = i y and y ∈ V(xσ i x ). (Note that in this last case we cannot have both y ∈ V(xσ i x ) and x ∈ V( yσ i x ), by the definition of a mgu.) This observation proves that the relation > on variables is an ordering. Next, we let
-either the multiset of variables occurring in T is strictly larger than the multiset of variables occurring in T ; such multisets are ordered by the multiset extension of the ordering on variables; -or else the multisets of variables are identical, and T T ; -or else T = T and the multiset of variables in u is strictly larger than the multiset of variables in u ; -or else, T = T , the multisets of variable are identical and the size of u is strictly larger than the size of u . This is an ordering as a lexicographic composition of orderings. Finally, any solved equation (i.e., substitution) is strictly smaller than any deducibility constraint, and equations are not comparable. The ordering we have just defined could have been used for the termination proof, as it is a well-founded ordering. It will now be considered as the default ordering on constraints, when a derivation sequence is fixed.
This ordering also satisfies the above required hypotheses for general constraint system transformations, as shown by the proof of the following proposition. PROPOSITION 4.14. The simplification rules on deducibility constraint systems form a general constraint system transformation.
PROOF. Let C 0 σ 0 C 1 σ 1 . . . be a simplification sequence. We consider the ordering on deducibility constraints (viewed as general constraints) defined above.
We show next that (4) holds. Note that in (4), c cannot be a solved equation, because at each step solved equations (x = xσ i ) may be added but no equation is eliminated. Thus let (T u) ∈ C i \ C i+1 , for some i ≥ 0. We need to show that
We investigate the possible transformation rules. For the rules R 2 , R 3 , R 3 , C i+1 = C i σ i . We have (T u) ≥ (T σ i uσ i ) since either the multiset of variables of T σ i is strictly smaller than the multiset of variables of T , or else T = T σ i and, in the latter case, either the multiset of variables of uσ i is strictly smaller than the multiset of variables of u or else uσ i = u. Moreover, cσ ∧ σ |= c for all constraints c and substitutions σ . Indeed, if θ is a solution of cσ ∧ σ then xθ = xσ θ for any x ∈ dom(σ ). It follows that cθ = cσ θ, and thus θ is a solution of c.
Hence, we have in particular that (T σ i uσ i ) ∧ σ i |= T u, which shows that (5) holds for this case.
For the rule R f , it suffices to notice that {T u 1 , . . . , T u n } |= (T f (u 1 , . . . , u n )) and (T u i ) < (T f (u 1 , . . . , u n )) for every i. For the rule R 1 , the constraint T u is a consequence of the (strictly smaller) constraints T x for T T . Finally, the rule R 4 only applies to unsatisfiable deducibility constraints.
The memorization strategy can be defined, similarly, for any general constraint system transformation. The correctness of the memorization strategy relies on the following invariant: PROOF. We prove, by induction on the length of the derivation sequence the following stronger result:
The base case is straightforward as D is empty. Next, assume that
But, again by definition of constraint transformations, any constraint in the second set is a consequence of the first set: we get {c ∈ C |c < d } |= d .
It follows that the memorization strategy is always correct when the original constraint transformation is correct. Now, the memorization strategy preserves the properties of our deducibility constraint systems: LEMMA 4.16. If C is a deducibility constraint system and C; ∅ * σ C ; D then C is a deducibility constraint system.
, with 0 ≤ i < n be the sequence of deducibility constraint systems obtained by applying successively the simplification rules, where C 0 = C, D 0 = ∅, C n = C , and C i σ i+1 C i+1 (and thus
We know that C i is a deducibility constraint system, by Lemma 4.6.
First, the left members of C i are linearly ordered by inclusion, as they are a subset of the left members of C i .
We consider now the other property of deducibility constraint systems. We let ≥ be the ordering on constraints defined before. We show below, by induction 
. Note that this property implies that C i is a deducibility constraint system: For every variable x ∈ V(C i ), there is (T x u) ∈ C i such that x ∈ V(u) \ V(T x ), as C i is a deducibility constraint system. If (T x u) ∈ C i then we're done, otherwise (T x u) ∈ D i , and hence, by the stated property, there is (T x u ) ∈ C i such that x ∈ V(u ) \ V(T x ). This shows that C i is a deducibility constraint system. The property holds trivially for i = 0. For the induction step, let x ∈ V(C i+1 ) and (T u) ∈ C i+1 be such that x ∈ V(u) \ V(T ). We investigate three cases.
-If C i+1 is obtained by one of the rules R 2 , R 3 , R 3 , then C i+1 = C i σ i+1 \ D i , and
x / ∈ dom(σ i+1 ). We assume without loss of generality that T u is a minimal
By induction hypothesis C i is a constraint system, and hence, for every y ∈ S, there is a (minimal) constraint
∈ V(T ) and T y T , it follows that x / ∈ V(T y ), and hence there is z ∈ V(T 1 ) such that x ∈ V(zσ i+1 ). It follows that z ∈ S and T z T 1 , which contradicts the minimality of
. Furthermore, at least one of the inequalities is strict: if (T u) ∈ D i the last inequality is strict,
It follows that (T 1 σ i+1 u 1 σ i+1 ) ∈ C i+1 by minimality of T u.
-If C i+1 is obtained by an R f rule, we may assume without loss of generality that T u is a minimal constraint in
, there is nothing to prove. Otherwise, u = f (u 1 , . . . , u n ) and, for every j , (T u j ) ∈ C i+1 ∪ D i . Moreover, there is an index j such that x ∈ V(u j )\V(T ) and, by minimality of T u, (T u j ) ∈ C i+1 , hence completing this case. Or else (T u) ∈ C i \ C i+1 , in which case u = f (u 1 , . . . , u n ) and (T u j ) ∈ C i+1 ∪ D i . As before, we conclude that for some j ,
is obtained by the rule R 1 , removing a constraint T 1 u 1 , then D i+1 = D i ∪ {T 1 u 1 } and, by Lemma 4.6 for any variable y ∈ V(u 1 ) \ V(T 1 ) there is a strictly smaller constraint (T 2 u 2 ) ∈ C i such that y ∈ V(u 2 ) \ V(T 2 ). Then we simply apply the induction hypothesis.
THEOREM 4.17. Let C be a deducibility constraint system, θ a substitution, and φ a security property.
(1) (Correctness) If C; ∅ * σ C ; D for some deducibility constraint system C and some substitution σ , if θ is an attack for C and φσ , then σ θ is an attack for C and φ. For completeness, from Lemma 4.11, we know that if C i is an unsolved deducibility constraint system and θ is an attack for C i and φ, then there is a deducibility constraint system C i+1 , a substitution σ i , and an attack τ i for C i+1 and φσ i such that C i σ i C i+1 and θ = σ i τ i . Then τ i is an attack also for C i+1 \ D i and φσ , for any set of constraints D i . By Lemma 4.16, we know that when D i represents already visited constraints, then C i+1 \ D i is a deducibility constraint system. We can thus conclude by induction on the derivation length n, taking
Concerning termination, we assume a DAG representation of the terms and constraints, in such a way that the size of the constraint is proportional to the number of the distinct subterms occurring in it. Next, observe that St(tσ ) ≤ (St(t) ∪ x∈dom(θ) St(xθ )). Hence, when unifying two subterms of t, with mgu θ , St(tθ) ≤ St(t) since, for every variable x ∈ dom(θ ), xθ is a subterm of t. It follows that, for any constraint system C ; D such that C; ∅ *
Next, observe that the number of distinct left hand sides of the constraints lhs(C ) is never increasing: lhs(C ) ≤ lhs(C). Furthermore, as long as we only apply the rules R 1 , R f , starting from C , the left hand sides of the deducibility constraint systems are fixed: there are at most lhs(C ) of them. Now, since, thanks to memorization, we cannot get twice the same constraint, the number of consecutive R 1 , R f steps is bounded by
It follows that the length of a derivation sequence is bounded by V(C) × lhs(C) × St(C) (for R 1 , R f steps) plus V(C) (for R 2 , R 3 , R 3 steps) plus 1 (for a possible R 4 step).
Theorem 4.17 extends the result of Rusinowitch and Turuani [2001] to sorted messages and general security properties. Handling arbitrary security properties is possible as soon as we do not forget any solution of the deducibility constraint systems (as we do). If we only preserve the existence of a solution of the constraint (as in Rusinowitch and Turuani [2001] ), it might be the case that the solution of C that we kept is not a solution of the property φ, while there are solutions of both φ and C, that were lost in the satisfiability decision of C. In addition, compared to Rusinowitch and Turuani [2001] , presenting the decision procedure using a small set of simplification rules makes it more easily amendable to further extensions and modifications. For example, Theorem 4.17 has been used in for proving that a new notion of secrecy in presence of hashes is decidable (and co-NP-complete) for a bounded number of sessions. Note that termination in polynomial time also requires the use of a DAG (Directed Acyclic Graph) representation for terms.
The following corollary is easily obtained from the previous theorem by observing that we can guess the simplification rules which lead to a solved form.
COROLLARY 4.18. Any property φ that can be decided in polynomial time on solved deducibility constraint systems can be decided in nondeterministic polynomial time on arbitrary deducibility constraint systems.
An Alternative Approach to Polynomial-Time Termination
Inspecting the completeness proof, there is still some room for choosing a strategy, while keeping completeness (correctness is independent of the order of the rules application). To obtain even more flexibility, we slightly relax the condition on the application of the rule R 2 on a constraint T u: we require unifying a subterm t ∈ St(T ) and a subterm t ∈ St(u) (instead of unifying t with u) where, as before, t = t , t, t nonvariables. Remark that this change preserves the completeness of the procedure.
Let us group the rules R 2 , R 3 , R 3 and call them substitution rules S. We write S (u, v) if the substitution is obtained by unifying u and v. There are some basic observations.
Hence we may always move forward the substitution rules.
hence any two consecutive applications of R f on different constraints can be performed in any order. (3) The rules R 1 , R 4 can be applied at any time when they are enabled; we may apply them eagerly or postpone them until no other rule can be applied.
Hence any two consecutive substitution rules can be performed in any order.
This provides with several complete strategies. For instance, the following strategy is complete.
-Apply eagerly R 4 and postpone R 1 as much as possible.
-Apply the substitution rules eagerly (as soon as they are enabled). This implies that all substitution rules are applied at once, since the rules R 1 , R 4 , R f cannot enable a substitution. -When R 4 and substitutions rules are not enabled, apply R f to the constraint, whose right hand side is maximal (in size).
Such a strategy will also yield polynomial length derivations, since we cannot get twice the same constraint: in any derivation sequence C 0 σ 1 · · · σ n C n , if (T u) ∈ C i \ C i+1 (we say then that T u has been eliminated at this step), then, for any j > i, (T u) / ∈ C j . Indeed, for the substitution rules, T u is eliminated only when x ∈ V(T u) and x ∈ dom(σ i+1 ), in which case for any j > i, x / ∈ V(C j ). And, if T u is eliminated by an R f rule, then |u| = max t∈rhs(C i ) |t|. If, for some j > i, the constraint T u was in C j +1 and not in C j , then we would have max t∈rhs(C j ) |t| > |u|. Thus the maximum of the sizes of the right hand sides terms would have increased, which is not possible according to our strategy.
Then the complexity analysis of the proof of Theorem 4.17 can be applied here.
The previous observations can also be used to bound the nondeterminism (which is useful in practice): for instance from (1) and (4), we see that substitution rules can be applied "don't care": if we use a substitution rule, we do not need to consider other alternatives. More precisely, if S(t, u) is a substitution rule that is applicable to C, let (C) be the set of substitution rules S(t , u ), which are applicable to C and such that there is no θ other than the identity such that mgu(t, u)θ = mgu(t , u ). Then
Similarly, from (5), a right-hand side member that is not unifiable with a nonvariable subterm of the corresponding left hand side, can be "don't care" decomposed:
is not unifiable with any nonvariable subterm of T .
DECIDABILITY OF ENCRYPTION CYCLES
Using the general approach presented in the previous section, verifying particular properties like the existence of key cycles or the conformation to an a priori given ordering relation on keys can be reduced to deciding these properties on solved deducibility constraint systems. We deduce a new decidability result, useful in models designed for proving cryptographic properties. To show that formal models (like the one presented in this article) are sound with respect to cryptographic ones, the authors usually assume that no key cycle can be produced during the execution of a protocol or, even stronger, assume that the "encrypts" relation on keys follows an a priori given ordering.
For simplicity, and since there are very few papers constraining the key relations in an asymmetric setting, in this section we restrict our attention to key cycles and key orders on symmetric keys. Moreover, we consider atomic keys for symmetric encryption since there exists no general definition (with a cryptographic interpretation) of key cycles in the case of arbitrary composed keys and soundness results are usually obtained for atomic keys.
More precisely, we assume a sort Key ⊂ Msg and we assume that the sort of enc is Msg×Key → Msg. All the other symbols are of sort Msg×· · ·×Msg → Msg. Hence only names and variables can be of sort Key. In this section we call key In this section, we consider (in)security properties of the form P (L) where P is a predicate symbol and L is a list of terms. Informally, σ will be a solution of P (L) if L s σ contains a key cycle. The precise interpretation of P depends on the notion of key-cycle: this is what we investigate first in the following section.
Key Cycles
Many definitions of key cycles are available in the literature. They are stated in terms of an "encryption" relation between keys or occurrences of keys. An early definition proposed by Abadi and Rogaway [2002] , identifies a key cycle with a cycle in the encryption relation, with no conditions on the occurrences of the keys. However, the definition induced by Laud's approach [Laud 2002] corresponds to searching for such cycles only in the "visible" parts of a message. For example the message enc(enc(k, k), k ) contains a key cycle using the former definition but does not when using the latter one and assuming that k is secret. It is generally admitted that the Abadi-Rogaway definition is unnecessarily restrictive and hence we will say that the corresponding key cycles are strict. However, for completeness reasons, we treat both cases.
There can still be other variants of the definition, depending on whether the relation "k encrypts k " is restricted or not to keys k that occur in plaintext. For example, enc(enc(a, k), k) may or may not contain a key cycle. As above, even if occurrences of keys used for encrypting (as k in enc(m, k)) need not be considered as encrypted keys, and hence can safely be ignored when defining key cycles, we consider both cases. Note that the initial Abadi-Rogaway setting considers that enc(enc(a, k), k) has a key cycle.
We write s < st t if and only if s is a subterm of t. is the least reflexive and transitive relation satisfying: s 1 (s 1 , s 2 ), s 2 (s 1 , s 2 ), and, if s t, then s enc(t, t ). Intuitively, s t if s is a subterm of t that either occurs (at least once) in clear (i.e., not encrypted) or occurs (at least once) in a plaintext position. A position p is a plaintext position in a term u if there exists an occurrence q of an encryption in u such that q · 1 ≤ p.
Definition 5.1. Let ρ 1 be a relation chosen in {< st , }. Let S be a set of terms and k, k be two keys. We say that k encrypts k in S (denoted k ρ Definition 5.2 (Strict Key Cycle). Let K be a set of keys. We say that a set of terms S contains a strict key cycle on K if there is a cycle in the restriction of the relation ρ S e on K . Otherwise we say that S is strictly acyclic on K . We define the predicate P skc as follows: L ∈ P skc if and only if the set {m | L s m} contains a strict key cycle on hidden(L s ).
We give now the definition induced by Laud's approach [Laud 2002 ]. He has showed in a passive setting that if a protocol is secure when the intruder's power is given by a modified Dolev-Yao deduction system ∅ , then the protocol is secure in the computational model, without requiring a "no key cycle" condition. Rephrasing Laud's result in terms of the standard deduction system gives rise to the definition of key cycles below, as has been proved in Janvier [2006] .
To state the following definition we need a more precise notion than the encrypts relation. We say that an occurrence q of a key k is protected by a key k in a term m if m| q = enc(m , k ) for some term m and some position q , and the occurrence of k at q in m is a plain-text occurrence of k in m , that is q · 1 ≤ q. We extend this definition in the intuitive way to sets of terms. This can be done for example by indexing the terms in the set and adding this index as a prefix to the position in the term to obtain the position in the set.
Definition 5.3 (Key cycle [Janvier 2006] ). Let K be a set of keys. We say that a set of terms S is acyclic on K if there exists a strict partial ordering ≺ on K such that for all k ∈ K , for all occurrences q of k in plain-text position in S, there is k ∈ K such that k ≺ k and q is protected by k in S. Otherwise we say that S contains a key cycle on K .
We define the predicate P kc as follows: for any list of terms L, L ∈ P kc if and only if the set {m | L s m} contains a key cycle on hidden(L s ).
We say that a term m contains a (strict) key cycle if the set {m} contains one.
Example 5.4. The messages m = enc(enc(k, k), k ) and m = enc(k 1 , k 2 ), enc(enc(k 2 , k 3 ), k 1 ) are acyclic, while the message m = enc(k 1 , k 2 ), enc(enc (k 2 , k 1 ), k 3 ) , k 3 has a key cycle. The orderings k ≺ k and k 3 ≺ k 2 ≺ k 1 prove it for m and m while for m such an ordering cannot be found since k 3 is deducible. However, all three messages have strict key cycles.
Key Orderings
In order to establish soundness of formal models in a symmetric encryption setting, the requirements on the encrypts relation can be even stronger, in particular in the case of an active intruder. Backes and Pfitzmann [2004] and Janvier et al. [2005] require that a key never encrypts a younger key. More precisely, the encrypts relation has to be compatible with the ordering in which the keys are generated. Hence we also want to check whether there exist executions of the protocol for which the encrypts relation is incompatible with an a priori given order on keys.
Definition 5.5 (Key ordering). Let ≺ be a strict partial ordering on a set of keys K . We say that a set of terms S is compatible with ≺ on K if Given a strict partial ordering ≺ on a set of keys, we define the predicate P ≺ as follows: P ≺ holds on a list of terms L if and only if the set {m | L s m} is compatible with ≺ on hidden(L s ).
For example, in Backes and Pfitzmann [2004] and Janvier et al. [2005] the authors choose ≺ to be the order in which the keys are generated: k ≺ k if k has been generated before k . We denote by P ≺ the negation of P ≺ . Indeed, an attack in this context is an execution such that the encrypts relation is incompatible with ≺.
Properties That Are Independent of the Notion of Key Cycle
We show how to decide the existence of key cycles or the conformation to an ordering in polynomial time for solved deducibility constraint systems. Note that the set of messages on which our predicates are applied usually contains all messages sent on the network and possibly some additional intruder knowledge.
We start with statements, that do not depend on which notion of key cycle we choose.
LEMMA 5.6. Let S be a set of terms, m be a term and k be a key such that S m and S k. Then for any plaintext occurrence q of k in m, there is a plain-text occurrence q 0 in S such that, if there is key k with S k , and which protects q 0 in S, then k protects q in m.
PROOF. We reason by induction on the depth of the proof of S m:
-if the last rule is an axiom, then m ∈ S. We may simply choose q 0 = q. -if the last rule is a decryption, then S enc(m, k ) and S k for some k = k.
Take the position q 1 = 1 · q in enc(m, k ). It is an occurrence of k. Applying the induction hypothesis we obtain an occurrence q 0 of k in S such that, if there is a key k with S k and which protects q 0 in S, then k protects q 1 in enc(m, k ). Since S k , it follows that k = k and hence k protects q in m. -if the last rule is a another rule, we proceed in a similar way as before.
As a corollary we obtain the following proposition, which states that, in the passive case, a key cycle can be deduced from a set S only if it already appears in S.
PROPOSITION 5.7. Let L be a list of ground terms, and ≺ a strict partial ordering on a set of keys. The predicate P kc (respectively, P skc 
or P ≺ ) holds on L if and only if L s contains a key cycle (respectively, L s contains a strict key cycle, or the encrypts relation on L s is not compatible with ≺).
PROOF. The right to left direction is trivial since L s ⊆ {m | L s m}. We will prove the left to right direction only for the key cycle property, the other two properties can be proved in a similar way. Assume that there is no strict partial ordering satisfying the conditions in Definition 5.3 for {m | L s m}. In other words, for any strict partial ordering ≺ on hidden(L s ) there is a key k and an occurrence q of k in {m | L s m} such that for any key k , k protects 
and u 2 θ = k. Then u 1 = enc(u, u 2 ) with uθ = m and u 2 θ = k. If u is a variable then, as in the previous case, we find an u satisfying the conditions. Suppose u is not a variable. We still need to show that
If u 2 is not a variable then u 2 θ = u 2 hence u 2 = u 2 . In both cases it follows that T i ∪ V(T i ) u. The projection rule case is simpler and is treated similarly.
-(composition rule) This case follows easily from the induction hypothesis applied on the premises.
COROLLARY 5.9. Let T x be a constraint of a solved deducibility constraint system C, and θ , θ be two solutions of C. Then for any key k, T θ k if and only if T θ k.
PROOF. Suppose that T θ k. From the previous lemma we obtain that there is a non-variable u with V(u) ⊆ V(T ) such that T ∪ V(T ) u and k = uθ . Since keys are atomic and θ is a ground substitution it follows that u = k.
k, since θ is a solution (and thus T θ xθ for all x ∈ V(T )) and by using Lemma 4.5.
Decision Results
On solved deducibility constraint systems, it is possible to decide in polynomial time, whether an attacker can trigger a key cycle or not, whatever notion of key cycle we consider: , for any P ∈ {P kc , P skc , P ≺ }.
We devote the remaining of this section to the proof of this proposition. We know by Proposition 5.7 that it is sufficient to analyze the encrypts (or protects) relation only on L s θ (and not on every deducible term), where θ is an arbitrary solution.
We can safely assume that there is exactly one deducibility constraint for each variable. Indeed, eliminating from C all constraints T x for which there is a constraint T x in C with T T we obtain an equivalent deducibility constraint system C : σ is a solution of C iff it is a solution of C. Let t x be the term obtained by pairing all terms of T x (in some arbitrary ordering). We write C as i (T i x i ), with 1 ≤ i ≤ n and T i ⊆ T i+1 . We construct the following substitution τ = τ 1 . . . τ n , and τ j is defined inductively as follows:
The construction is correct by the definition of deducibility constraint systems. It is clear that τ is a solution of C. We show next that it is sufficient to analyze this particular solution.
Key cycles. We focus first on the property P kc .
LEMMA 5.11. Let C be a solved deducibility constraint system, L a list of terms such that V(L) ⊆ V(C), lhs(C) ⊆ L s , and assume P is interpreted as P kc . Then there is an attack for C and P (L) if and only if τ is an attack for C and P (L).
PROOF. We have to prove that if there is no partial ordering satisfying the conditions in Definition 5.3 for the set L s θ (according to Proposition 5.7) then there is no partial ordering satisfying the same conditions for L s τ . Suppose that there is a strict partial ordering ≺ which satisfies the conditions for L s τ . We prove that the same partial ordering does the job for L s θ.
Let C = C ∧(L s z) where z is a new variable. C is a deducibility constraint system since lhs(C) ⊆ L s . We write C as i (T i x i ), with 1 ≤ i ≤ n and T i ⊆ T i+1 . We prove by induction on i that for all k ∈ hidden(L s θ ), for all plaintext occurrences q of k in T i θ there is a key k ∈ hidden(L s θ) such that k ≺ k and k protects q in T i θ. It is sufficient to prove this since for i = n we have T i = L s . Remark also that from Corollary 5.9 applied to L s z we obtain that hidden(L s θ ) = hidden(L s τ ).
For i = 1 we have T 1 = T 1 θ = T 1 τ hence the property is clearly satisfied for θ since it is satisfied for τ .
Let i > 1. Consider an occurrence q of a key k ∈ hidden(L s θ) in a plain-text position of w for some w ∈ T i θ. Let t ∈ T i such that w = tθ.
If q is a nonvariable position in t then it is a position in tτ . And since τ is a solution we have that there is a key k ∈ hidden(L s τ ) (hence k ∈ hidden(L s θ)) such that k ≺ k and q is protected by k in tτ . The key k cannot occur in some xτ , with x ∈ V(t), since otherwise k is deducible (indeed xτ = k since the keys are atomic and T x τ xτ ). Hence k occurs in t. Then k protects q in t, and thus in w also.
If q is not a nonvariable position in t then there is a variable x j ∈ V(t) with j < i such that the occurrence q in tθ is an occurrence of k in x j θ (formally q = p · q where p is some position of x j in t and q is some occurrence of k in x j θ ). Applying Lemma 5.6 we obtain that there is an occurrence q 0 of k in T j θ such that if there is a key k with T j θ k and which protects q 0 in T j θ then k protects q in x j θ . The existence of the key k is assured by the induction hypothesis on T j θ . Hence k protects q in x j θ and thus q in w. since otherwise
If q is not a nonvariable position in L s then there is a variable x ∈ V(L s ) such that Hence we only need to check whether τ is an attack for C and P (L). Let K = hidden(L s τ ). We build inductively the sets K 0 = ∅ and for all i ≥ 1,
where Pos p (m, T ) denotes the plaintext positions of a term m in a set T . Observe that for all i ≥ 0, K i ⊆ K i+1 . This can be proved easily by induction on i. Moreover, since K is finite and PROOF. Consider first that there exists i ≥ 0 such that K i = K . Then take the following strict partial ordering on K : k ≺ k if and only if there is j ≥ 0 such that k ∈ K j and k / ∈ K j . Consider a key k ∈ K and a plaintext occurrence q of k in L s τ . Then take l ≥ 1 minimal such that k ∈ K l . By the definition of K l there is k ∈ K such that k protects q and k
That is, we can build an infinite sequence . . . ≺ k ≺ k with distinct elements from a finite set -contradiction. So there exists i ≥ 0 such that K i = K .
Hence to check whether Lτ ∈ P kc , we only need to construct the sets K i until K i+1 = K i and then to check whether K i = K . This algorithm is similar to a classical method for finding a topological sorting of vertices (and for finding cycles) of directed graphs. It is also similar to that given by Janvier [2006] for the intruder deduction problem considering the deduction system of Laud [2002] . -m = tθ for some t ∈ T i (axiom rule). We can have that either there is t t such that t θ = enc(u, k), or enc (u, k) yθ for some y ∈ V(t). In the first case take v = t , w = t. In the second case, by the definition of deducibility constraint systems, there exists (T j y) ∈ C with j < i. Since T j θ yθ and T j θ k (since T j ⊆ T i ), we deduce by induction hypothesis that there exists a nonvariable term v such that v w for some w ∈ T j , hence w ∈ T i and vθ = enc(u, k). -Let m be the premise of the rule (decomposition rule). We have that T i θ m (with a proof of a strictly smaller length) and m m thus enc(u, k) m . By induction hypothesis, we deduce that there exists a nonvariable term v such that v w for some w ∈ T i and vθ = enc(u, k). -All cases are similar to the previous one except if m = enc(u, k) and the rule is S x S y S enc(x, y) (composition rule). But this case contradicts T i θ k.
The following simple lemma is also needed for the proof of Lemma 5.15.
LEMMA 5.14. Let T x be a constraint of a solved deducibility constraint system C, θ be a solution, k ∈ hidden(T θ ), and m a term such that T θ m. If k ρ 1 m then there is t ∈ T such that k ρ 1 t.
PROOF. We write C as i (T i x i ), with 1 ≤ i ≤ n and T i ⊆ T i+1 . Consider the index i of the constraint T x, that is such that (T i u i ) ∈ C, T i = T and u i = x. The lemma is proved by induction on (i, l ) (considering the lexicographical ordering) where l is the length of the proof of T i θ m. Consider the last rule of the proof: -m ∈ T i θ or m a public constant (axiom rule). If m is a public constant then k = m since k ∈ hidden(T θ). Thus there is t ∈ T i such that m = tθ. If k ρ 1 t then we're done. Otherwise there is a variable y ∈ V(t) such that k ρ 1 yθ . Also, there is j < i such that T j y is a constraint of C. Then, by induction hypothesis, there is t ∈ T j , hence in T i , such that k ρ 1 t .
-By inspection of all the composition and decomposition rules we observe that there is always a premise T i θ m with k ρ 1 m for some term m (composition or decomposition rule). The conclusion follows then directly from the induction hypothesis.
The following lemma shows that it is sufficient to analyze τ when checking the properties P skc and P ≺ . 
Then there are terms u, u such that u ∈ L s θ , enc(u, k) u and k ρ 1 u. We can have that either (first case) there are v, w such that v w ∈ L s , v nonvariable and enc(u, k) = vθ , or (second case) enc (u, k) xθ with x ∈ V(L s ). In the second case, consider the constraint (T x x) ∈ C. We have T x θ xθ . Hence we can apply Lemma 5.13 for xθ, u and k to obtain that there exists a nonvariable term v such that v w for some w ∈ T x and vθ = enc(u, k). Hence, in both cases, we obtained that there is
Since k ρ 1 u and k is a name or a variable, we can have that
in L s τ also. If k ρ 1 yθ then from the previous lemma k ρ 1 t for some t ∈ T y , and hence k ρ 1 yτ . Therefore in both cases we have that k encrypts k in L s τ .
We deduce that deciding whether there is an attack for C and P (L), when P is interpreted as P skc ,can be done simply by deciding whether the restriction of the relation ρ
Deciding whether there is an attack for C and P (L), when P is interpreted as P ≺ , can be done by deciding whether the restriction to K × K of the relation ρ 
Verifying any of the three properties requires a preliminary step of computing K = hidden(L s τ ). Computing deducible subterms can be performed in linear time, hence this computation step requires |L|) . It follows that the complexity of deciding whether there is an attack for C and P (L) is O(|L| 2 ), when P is interpreted as P kc , P skc or P ≺ . 
NP-Completeness
Let C be a deducibility constraint system and L a list of terms such that V(L s ) ⊆ V(C) and lhs(C) ⊆ L s . The NP membership of deciding whether there is an attack for C and P (L) (for our 3 possible interpretations of P ) follows immediately from Corollary 4.18 and Proposition 5.10. NP-hardness is obtained by adapting the construction for NP-hardness provided in Rusinowitch and Turuani [2003] . More precisely, we consider the reduction of the 3SAT problem to our problem. For any 3SAT Boolean formula we construct a protocol such that the intruder can deduce a key cycle if and only if the formula is satisfiable. The construction is the same as in Rusinowitch and Turuani [2003] (pages 15 and 16) except that, in the last rule, the participant responds with the term enc(k, k), for some fresh key k (initially secret), instead of Secret. Then it is easy to see that the only way to produce a key cycle on a secret key is to play this last rule which is equivalent, using Rusinowitch and Turuani [2003] , to the satisfiability of the corresponding 3SAT formula.
AUTHENTICATION-LIKE PROPERTIES
We propose a simple decidable logic for security properties. This logic enables in particular to specify authentication-like properties.
A Simple Logic
The logic enables terms comparisons and is closed under Boolean connectives.
Definition 6.1. The logic L is inductively defined by: Example 6.2. Let us consider again the authentication property introduced in Example 3.8. There is an attack on authentication between A and B if A and B do not agree on the nonce n a sent by A for B, that is if x = n a at the end of the run of the protocol. This can be expressed by the following formula
The substitution σ 1 (assigning x to n a ) is an attack for C 1 (defined in Example 3.8) and φ 1 and demonstrates a failure of authentication.
More sophisticated properties can be expressed using the logic L. For example, when two sessions of the same role are executed, one can expressed that an agent has received exactly once the right nonce n a , with the following formula.
where x 1 (resp. x 2 ) represents the nonce received by the agent in the first (resp. second) session. We can also express properties of the form: if two agents agree on some term u, they also agree on some term v. This can be indeed modeled by the formula
where u 1 (resp. u 2 ) represents the view of u by the first (resp. second) agent and v 1 (resp. v 2 ) represents the view of v by the first (resp. second) agent. The formula A → B is the usual notation for the formula ¬A ∨ B.
6.2 Decidability THEOREM 6.3. Let C be a deducibility constraint system and φ be a formula of L. Deciding whether there is an attack for C and φ can be performed in nondeterministic polynomial time.
PROOF. First, choosing nondeterministically φ 1 or φ 2 in any subformula φ 1 ∨ φ 2 , we may, w.l.o.g. only consider the case where φ is a conjunction
Let σ be a mgu (idempotent, which does not introduce new variables) of j u j = u j . The deducibility constraint system C has a joined solution with φ if and only if Cσ and φ d σ have a common solution. As in the previous sections, we choose a representation of expressions, such that applying a mgu of subterms of an expression e on e does not increase the size of the expression e.
We are now left to the case where we have to decide whether a deducibility constraint system has a solution together with a property of the form φ = If, for some i, u i is identical to v i , then there is clearly no solution. We claim that, otherwise, there is always a solution. This is an independence of disequation lemma (as in Colmerauer [1984] for instance), and the proof is similar to other independence of disequations lemmas: LEMMA 6.4. Let C be a solved deducibility constraint system and φ be the formula t 1 = u 1 ∧ . . . ∧ t n = u n such that V(φ) ⊆ V(C) and, for every i, t i is not identical to u i . Then there is always a solution θ of C and φ. This is proved by induction on the number of variables of φ. In the base case, there is no variable and the result is trivial as φ is a tautology.
Let T 0 be the smallest left-hand side of C. T 0 must be a nonempty set of ground terms. Note that there is an infinite set of deducible terms from T 0 .
Let x ∈ V(φ). For each i, either t i = u i has no solution, in which case t i = u i is always satisfied, or else let S = {xσ i | σ i = mgu(t i , u i )}. We choose t x such that T t x and t x / ∈ S. This is possible since S is finite and there are infinitely many terms deducible from T . Now 
TIMESTAMPS
For modeling timestamps, we introduce a new sort Time ⊆ Msg for time and we assume an infinite number of names of sort Time, represented by rational numbers or integers. We assume that the only two sorts are Time and Msg. Any value of time should be known to an intruder, that is why we add to the deduction system the rule S a for any name a of sort Time. All the previous results can be easily extended to such a deduction system since ground deducibility remains decidable in polynomial time.
To express relations between timestamps, we use timed constraints.
Definition 7.1. An integer timed constraint or a rational timed constraint T is a conjunction of formulas of the form k i=1 α i x i β, where the α i and β are rational numbers, ∈ {<, ≤}, and the x i are variables of sort Time. A solution of a rational (resp. integer) timed constraint T is a closed substitution σ = { c 1 / x 1 , . . . , c k / x k }, where the c i are rationals (resp. integers), that satisfies the constraint.
Such timed properties can be used for example to say that a timestamp x 1 must be fresher than a timestamp x 2 (x 1 ≥ x 2 ) or that x 1 must be at least 30 seconds fresher than x 2 (x 1 ≥ x 2 + 30). A sends to a server S a fresh key K ab intended for B. If the timestamp T a is fresh enough, the server answers by forwarding the key to B, adding its own timestamps. B simply checks whether this timestamp is older than any other message he has received from S. As explained in [Clark and Jacob 1997] , this protocol is flawed because an attacker can use the server to keep a session alive as long as he wants by replaying the answers of the server.
This protocol can be modeled by the following deducibility constraint system: b, s, a, enc( 0, b, k ab 
where y 1 , y 2 , y 3 are variables of sort Msg and x t 1 , . . . , x t 7 are variables of sort Time. We add explicitly the timestamps emitted by the agents on the right hand side of the constraints (that is in the messages expected by the participants) since the intruder can schedule the message transmission whenever he wants. Note that on the right hand side of constraints we do have terms, but by abuse of notation we have omitted the pairing function symbol. Initially, the intruder simply knows the names of the agents and A's message at time 0. Then S answers alternatively to requests from A and B. Since the intruder controls the network, the messages can be scheduled as slow (or fast) as the intruder needs it. The server S should not answer if A's timestamp is too old (let's say older than 30 seconds) thus S's timestamp cannot be too much delayed (no more than 30 seconds). This means that we should have x t 2 ≤ x t 1 + 30. Similarly, we should have x t 4 ≤ x t 3 + 30 and x t 6 ≤ x t 5 + 30. The last rule corresponds to B's reception. In this scenario, B does not perform any check on the timestamp since it is the first message he receives.
We say that there is an attack if there is a joined solution of the deducibility constraint system and the previously mentioned time constraints together with x t 7 ≥ 30. This last constraint expresses that the timestamp received by B is too large to come from A. Altogether, the time constraint becomes x t 2 ≤ x t 1 + 30 ∧ x t 4 ≤ x t 3 + 30 ∧ x t 6 ≤ x t 5 + 30 ∧ x t 7 ≥ 30. Then the substitution corresponding to the attack is PROOF SKETCH. Let C be a solved deducibility constraint system, and T a timed constraint. Let y 1 , . . . , y n be the variables of sort Msg in C and x 1 , . . . , x k the variables of sort Time in C. Clearly, any substitution σ of the form y i σ = u i where u i ∈ S i for some (S i y i ) ∈ C and x i σ = t i for t i any constant of sort Time is a solution of C. Let σ be the restriction of σ to the timed variables x 1 , . . . , x k .
σ is an attack for C and T if and only if σ is a solution to T . Thus there exists an attack for C and T if and only if T is satisfiable. COROLLARY 7.4. Deciding whether a deducibility constraint system, together with a time constraint, has a solution is NP-complete.
PROOF. The NP membership follows from the NP membership of time constraint satisfiability, Theorem 4.3 and Proposition 7.3.
NP-hardness directly follows from the NP-hardness of deducibility constraint system solving, considering an empty timed constraint.
CONCLUSIONS
We have shown how, revisiting the approach of Comon-Lundh and Shmatikov [2003] and Rusinowitch and Turuani [2003] , we can preserve the set of solutions, instead of only deciding the satisfiability. We also derived NPcompleteness results for some security properties: key-cycles, authentication, time constraints.
Since the constraint-based approach [Comon-Lundh and Shmatikov 2003; Rusinowitch and Turuani 2003 ] has already been implemented in AVISPA [Armando et al. 2005] , it is likely that we can, with only slight efforts, adapt this implementation to the case of key cycles and timestamps.
More generally, we would like to take advantage of our result to derive decision procedures for even more security properties. A typical example would be the combinations of several properties. Also, we could investigate nontrace properties such as anonymity or guessing attacks, for which there are very few decision results (only Baudet [2005] , whose procedure is quite complex). Regarding key cycles, our approach is valid for a bounded number of sessions only. Secrecy is undecidable in general [Durgin et al. 2004] for an unbounded number of sessions. Such an undecidability result could be easily adapted to the problem of detecting key cycles. Secrecy is decidable for several classes of protocols [Ramanujam and Suresh 2003; Comon-Lundh and Cortier 2003; Blanchet and Podelski 2003; Verma et al. 2005] and an unbounded number of sessions. We plan to investigate how such fragments could be used to decide key cycles. 
